Arms Race in the Sahel
By Daniel Volman
20 August 2025
The wave of military coups that have taken place in the Sahel over the past five years have led to dramatic changes in the strategic orientation of the entire region. The new regimes have expelled troops from France, the European Union, and the United States engaged in counter-terrorism operations against jihadist groups and conducting peacekeeping operation. They have withdrawn from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and formed a new organization, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES, the Alliance des États du Sahel) to coordinate the fight against the jihadists.
They have hired Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group (now the Africa Corps) to protect their regimes and lead their anti-jihadist operations. And the military juntas have used their considerable mineral resources to pay for new weaponry, mostly from Russia and China, and the services of Russian mercenaries, while granting Russian and Chinese firms control of mines and other economic assets.
Arms Sales to the Sahel
Since 7 June 2021, when military officers led by Colonel Assimi Goïta seized power in Mali, the military junta has purchased a variety of new military equipment, primarily from Russia. In 2022, it ordered three M-8 and M-17 transport helicopters from Russia, which were delivered that same year. It also ordered five L-39 “Albatros” armed trainer aircraft and two more M-8 transport helicopters, which were delivered in the following year. In 2023, Russia delivered an Il-76 heavy transport plane to Mali, and in 2004 delivered an An-28 light transport plane. In January 2024, Russia delivered more armored vehicles, including five T-72 tanks, BMD infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-880 armored personnel carriers, and Spartak armored vehicles.
The military junta in Mali also ordered 80 VP-11 armored personnel carriers from China in 2022, which were delivered the following year. In March 2023, it acquired a large number of additional VP-11 armored personnel carriers from China. In 2025, it began taking delivery of 160 Chinese VP-14 armored personnel carriers. And in 2023, Burkina Faso ordered 20 Guardian armored personnel carriers manufactured by the International Armored Group in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which were delivered that same year.
Since 30 September 2022, when Captain Ibrahim Traoré overthrew a previous military regime, Burkina Faso has also embarked on a major spending spree for new weaponry. In June 2024, it took delivery of 50 VP-11 and 50 VP-14 armored personnel carriers from China. That same year, China delivered 16 VN-22 armored fighting vehicles, ten WZ-551 armored personnel carriers, and six Assaulter armored fire-support vehicles to Burkina Faso. The sale included PLL-05 self-propelled gun-mortars and SR-5 multiple rocket-launch systems, which were delivered in August 2025 .
Burkina Faso also took delivery of at least two Bayraktar Akinci drones and five Bayraktar TB-2 drones from Turkey in April 2024, with as many as twelve previously delivered since April 2022. To arm the drones, Burkina Faso bought 20 Teber guided missiles in 2023 and took delivery in 2024.
And on 28 July 2023, General Abdourahamane Tchiani led a coup in Niger to overthrow the elected government of Mohamed Bazoum. Following the expulsion of American troops, 100 Russian military instructors arrived in Niger in April 2024 and delivered equipment that, according to Nigerien state radio RTN, will provide Niger with the “latest generation of anti-aircraft defense systems.”
Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group, in 2023, the Wagner Group’s mercenary forces in the Sahel and other parts of Africa have been taken over by the Russian Ministry of Defense and rebranded as the Africa Corps. In December 2024, Russia dispatched 1,000 soldiers from the Africa Corps to Mali, while 1,500 from the Wagner Group were still there. Wagner forces left Mali in June 2025, but some of their officers and men transferred to the Africa Corps, raising its strength to approximately 2,000 men. Some 100 Africa Corps soldiers arrived in Burkina Faso in January 2024 to replace Wagner Group forces in that country, and that number is expected to rise to about 300. And in April 2024, 100 Russian soldiers arrived in Niger, presumably to operate the country’s new anti-aircraft defense system.
Arms Sales to Coastal West Africa
In response to the spread of jihadist groups into the states of coastal west African have also engaged in major arms purchases. In particular, the United States—hoping to relocate American drone operations in this region after they were forced to withdraw from Niger ,–has sold arms to Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana. And other arms producers have also made significant sales to the region.
In August 2025, nine newly-acquired Cayman armored personnel carriers and four Calidus MCAV-20 armored personnel carriers were put on display in Benin, at that county’s Independence Day parade. The former is manufactured by Belarus and the latter is produced by South Africa. Also on display were Dongfeng CSK-131, VAB-VTT, BRDM-2, and “Puma” armored personnel carriers. The latter were originally destined for Niger, but were instead diverted to Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana; a dozen were delivered to Benin in November 2024. The “Puma” is manufactured in South Africa, by OTT Technologies, and in the United States, by United Manufacturing Technologies (OTT-USA).
In January 2024, the Biden administration approved the sale of 12 M-36 “Puma” armored vehicles to Cote d’Ivoire, which were delivered in April 2025. But that country has also obtained at least 11 P-11 armored vehicles, at least 15 Dong Feng EQ-2050 armored personnel carriers, and half a dozen VN-22 armored fire-support vehicles from China. The Emirati firm International Armored Group delivered BATT UMG and Terrier LT-79 armored vehicles. Turkey delivered at least 20 Otokar “Cobra II” armored personnel carriers. And Cote d ‘Ivoire acquired nineteen Springbuck SD armored personnel carriers from South Africa.
And in May 2025, Ghana took receipt of 14 “Puma” M-36 armored personnel carriers from the United States. Valued at more than $6 million, these vehicles are designed to bolster troops protection, mobility, and effectiveness in counter-terrorism and internal security operations.
Russian and Chinese Economic Interests in the Sahel
To pay for all this weaponry, the military juntas have devoted an increasing share of their government spending on arms purchases and granted Russian and Chinese firms control of mining operations throughout the region. While these sales appear to be conducted on normal financial terms, they facilitate the acquisition of mining concessions and other economic assets.
Russian companies gained control of gold mining concessions in the Fekola and Loulo regions of Mali after the arrival of mercenaries from the Wagner Group in the country. Russian firms, including Uranium One, a Rosatom subsidiary, signed deals to explore and develop uranium and lithium deposits in Mali. And, on 23 June 2025, Vladimir Putin met with Colonel Assimi Goita in Moscow and announced that Russia had signed a series of new economic agreements with Mali.
The Russian company, Nordgold, signed an agreement in April 2025 with Burkina Faso to develop gold mining and the Russian company, Rosatom, is pursuing access to uranium in Niger. Niger’s mining minister said in November 2024 that the country was discussing the exploitation of uranium and “other natural resources” with Russian companies.
The Chinese company, Ganfeng Lithium, signed an investment agreement with Mali, including the Goulamina project , a joint venture project which focuses on lithium mining and processing. The project progressed well and Ganfeng Lithium commenced production in in December 2024. Another Chinese company, Wang Kang, has invested several million dollars in Mali, for the production of cement, ceramics, lime, and iron. The People’s Republic of China owns a majority stake in Niger’s oil field, its oil refinery, and a newly constructed pipeline to Benin that will allow Niger to double production. And, in May 2023, the Chinese firm, Sinopec, entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Nigerien government for the development of further oil resources.
War Crimes in the Sahel
Reliable reports continue to document numerous war crimes committed by government forces and by Africa Corps units In the Sahel. Recent reports by Amnesty Internationa l and Human Rights Watch are only the most recent documentation of the escalation of violence by the military junta and Russian soldiers in Burkina Faso and Mali .
In fact, data collected by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project shows that Sahelian government troops and soldiers from the new Africa Corps killed more civilians in 2024 than the jihadists. According to a report prepared by the Africa Center for Security Studies, there were 356 incidents of violence against civilians linked to the military juntas and allied Russian forces in 2024, a 36 percent increase from the previous year. This resulted in the deaths of 2,109 civilians, exceeding the deaths of 1,778 civilians at the hands of the Islamist groups.
In Mali, according to the report , 82 percent of reported violence against civilians were inflicted by government soldiers and Africa Corps forces over the past year, the highest of the three Sahelian countries. In Burkina Faso, the figure is 41 percent. Over the past four years, they have killed 6,058 people in the Sahel, exceeding the 5,708 people killed by the Islamists.
And Rachel Chason and Sarah Cahlan of the Washington Post traveled to Mauritania to interview some of the tens of thousands of people who have fled Mali to escape from the attacks by government forces and Russian soldiers and to seek refuge in Mauretania and other neighboring countries. In an investigative article published in March 2025, they reported that “mercenaries with Russia’s Wagner Group, fighting alongside Malian soldiers, have assaulted women, massacred civilians and burned villages in Mali, the displaced say — a campaign of wanton violence that is fueling a rapidly growing refugee crisis to the west in neighboring Mauritania.”
They reported that “the exodus last year was unprecedented; there are now some 149,000 people in and around Mbera [refugee camp in southeastern Mauretania]—triple the number in 2023, according to the United Nations. The camp itself is long past capacity and sprawls in every direction. In more than two dozen interviews, refugees who have arrived since 2023 said it was attacks by Mali’s military and its Russian allies—not Islamist militants—that made them flee.”
In 2024, Lindsay Freeman, director of the Technology, Law & Policy program at the Human Rights Center, UC Berkeley School of Law, submitted a legal brief to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 200-page brief asked the ICC to review its confidential legal report arguing that the Russia-linked Wagner Group has committed war crimes by spreading images of apparent atrocities in West Africa on social media, including ones alluding to cannibalism, according to the brief seen exclusively by The Associated Press.” The ICC told the Associated Press it “could not comment on the brief, but said that it was aware of ‘various reports of alleged human rights violations in other parts of Mali,’ adding that it ‘follows closely the situation.’”
And, on 15 June 2025, four Tuareg community organizations—Imouhagh International, Kel Akal, Diaspora of the United States, and the Azawad Solidarity Association—filed a formal complaint with the office of the ICC Prosecutor against the armed forces of Mali and Burkina Faso, as well as the Africa Corps, for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The complaint accuses them of acts of murder, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, looting, and torture.
Where Do the Jihadists Obtain Their Weaponry?
A report by Conflict Armament Research, published in April 2025, shows that the jihadist groups obtain most of their weapons by seizing them during attacks on government forces, raiding government arsenals, and buying them from corrupt soldiers. According to RFI, the “weapons were seized during attacks on national forces in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso and “the researchers also identified weapons that originally belonged to forces in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Libya, Niger, and Chad.”
Only a very small proportion of their weaponry came from military stockpiles in Libya that were left unguarded after a multinational force authorized to intervene by the UN Security Council (Russia and China both choose to abstain, rather than veto the resolution) overthrew the regime of Muamar Qadhafi in 2011.
And, according to the RFI article , “the report found ‘no evidence that the groups are able to access weapons directly outside of the Central Sahel, or that they have established supply sources distinct from those available to other illicit armed actors in the region. This debunks the idea that either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State are supplying weapons to Sahel-based jihadist groups directly. It also undermines online conspiracy theories claiming that foreign powers—particularly France—are arming the fighters.”
The Sahel and the New Geopolitics of Conflict in Africa
The arms race in the Sahal is a perfect illustration of the new geopolitics of conflict in Africa and highlights some of its key features. Western hegemony, especially the economic and military power of France, has declined precipitously in recent years. In particular, France has been expelled from the network of military bases which it established in the region after the end of French colonial rule. The United States relied on France and other European powers to use their military forces to maintain Western hegemony in Africa and then, in 2007, created its own combatant command, the US Africa Command (Africom), to support French forces in the region and to protect US interests in Africa after the events of 11 September 2001 and the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. But now French troops have been expelled from the region and US soldiers stationed in Niger to conduct drone operations have been forced to withdraw by the new military junta.
Russia and China have been able to take advantage of the decline of Western hegemony and the failure of the American counter-insurgency strategy to pursue their own interests. Russian mercenaries, arms sales, and investments—primarily in gold mining—provide the Putin regime with gold and foreign currency which it can use to evade the economic sanctions that have been imposed on Russia since its invasion of Ukraine began 2014. Chinese arms sales are a small, but significant, source of income for China’s military industries and its investments, first in oil and then in lithium, have gained it access to valuable sources of strategic raw materials to fuel its economy.
And important new external actors—particularly “middle powers” like Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates—have emerged and pursued their own economic, ideological, and military objectives in Africa. Their arms sales—both countries specialize in the production of drones—have played a key role in a number of recent conflicts in African countries, including Libya, Ethiopia, and Sudan, as well as in the Sahel.
In the current non-hegemonic world order, African countries are now able to obtain military assistance and economic investments from a number of different, and competing, external actors; and, at least to a certain extent, African regimes can try to manipulate these external actors against each other. But it has also undermined democratization and facilitated military coups. It has made it easier for military juntas to repress civil society and to resist popular demands for democratic elections and the restoration of civilian rule. And it has encouraged these military juntas to rely on the use of increasing levels of violence to counter the jihadists and other insurgents, and to stay in power.
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Outgoing and Incoming Heads of US Africa Command Testify Before Congress on Trump’s Military Policy Toward Africa
By Daniel Volman
5 August 2025
On 10 June 2025, General Michael Langley, the outgoing commander of the US Africa Command [Africom] testified before the House Armed Services Committee hearing on “US Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East and Africa.” It was his final appearance before the committee as Africom commander before the end of his term in office this summer. On 22 July 2025, Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, US Air Force, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on his nomination to the rank of general and to be the next commander of Africom. Their testimony presents as clear a picture of the role that Africom will play in President Donald Trump’s second term as we are likely to see.
In his opening statement on 10 June 2025, House Armed Services Committee chairman Mike Rogers (Republican of Alabama) declared that “Al-Shabaab, ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], and al-Qaeda are all gaining ground on the continent. Recent US strikes have disrupted their operations. That pressure must continue. Yet, Africom is consistently under-resourced. Even modest increases in ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and security cooperation would go a long way and empower our African partners to take on more of the burden in the fight against terrorism.”
“We must also confront China’s growing footprint in Africa,” said Representative Rogers. “The reality is that the threat that China poses to the United States extends well beyond the Indo-Pacific. In Africa, Beijing is securing critical minerals and building military infrastructure—from Djibouti to West Africa. If China secures a permanent naval base on Africa’s Atlantic coast, it will threaten vital sea lanes and have serious consequences for our ability to defend the homeland. Russia is also deepening its presence across Africa. It is trading arms and mercenaries for access to Africa’s gold, oil, and other resources. The resulting revenue is helping fund Putin’s malign activities worldwide.”
In his prepared statement for the hearing, General Langley stated that Africom “is committed to and focused on safeguarding the homeland from threats emanating from Africa, protecting vital US interests by countering adversary efforts, and responding to crises across the African continent.” Africa, he said, “is a ‘nexis theater’—a continent where global interests converge.” It is “a continent from which the United States cannot afford to shift its gaze. It is imperative that we create conditions where terrorist organizations and malign actors are unable to threaten our homeland, while simultaneously creating conditions for American economic interests to flourish.”
“We are acutely aware,” Langley said , “that if ISIS and al-Qaeda groups continue their expansion, they will pose a direct threat to the US homeland.” And, he declared, “I am greatly concerned about indications of Houthi (part of the Iranian threat network) and al-Shabaab collaboration. The Houthi’s have the capacity to attack the Djibouti Base Cluster [Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, the sole US military base in Africa], should they decide to escalate against the United States. If they establish a foothold in East Africa, the threat to global trade and shipping would increase significantly, bring a highly capable, belligerent actor into a region already struggling against ISIS and al-Shabaab.”
In West Africa, Langley warned that “without a persistent presence in the Sahel, we are limited in the ability to monitor the expanding influence of terrorist organizations in the region. Our assessment indicates that, if left unchecked, these organizations will continue to grow and their threat to regional stability, as well as to US national security interests, will only intensify.” Therefore, “we are increasing our efforts in intelligence sharing and information operations to monitor the growth of these groups and expanding relationships with willing partners elsewhere in West Africa like Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria”
In Central Africa, Langley said , “US Africom is establishing a Defense Economics Branch to collaborate with OSC [US Office of Strategic Capital, founded by the Secretary of Defense in December 2022, during the Biden administration] and proactively target investment opportunities in priority countries and toward strategic objectives.” And, “to counter China’s harmful practices, the United States interagency is investing to improve the business enabling environment and to facilitate new investments in mining and infrastructure. US Africom is supporting US efforts to increase investments for responsible and mutually beneficial mineral supply chains in Africa.”
According to General Langley , “China seeks to expand security partnerships to protect its extensive infrastructure investments, loans, and economic partnerships under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” China “exploits their relationships in Africa for economic gain and to secure critical minerals and resources.” And “this growing presence by China complicates the already volatile security landscape and highlights the critical need for sustained US engagement and robust support for regional partners to adequately compete.” In addition, General Langley went on to say, “it’s where the Russian Federation seizes opportunities created by chaos and instability.”
In answer to a question from Ranking Member Adam Smith (Democrat of Washington) regarding his assessment of “adjustments that we need to make in our posture,” General Langley replied that “there’s a lot of concerning aspects to Africa, but West Africa right now seems to be the most concerning. I mean it seems that the most capable terrorist organization is, you know, gaining influence in multiple countries and threatening others. We don’t have much of a presence there.”
And when Representative Smith asked for his recommendations to contain that threat, General Langley said that “since we moved out of Niger, we had to reset our CT [counter-terrorism] strategy and that’s further engagement, especially with the coastal West African countries who are building capabilities and capacity to deter and in a number of countries it’s working, but JNIM [Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin] and AQIM [Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb] and also ISIS-Sahel are really starting to get their footing and project themselves across the AES [Alliance des États du Sahel] countries of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.”
On 22 July 2025, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing to consider the nomination of US Air Force Lieutenant General Dagvin Anderson to the rank of general and the post of Africom’s next commander. In his opening statement , Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Roger Wicker (Republican of Mississippi) declared that Anderson and other nominees “will confront a global security environment that is defined by emboldened aggressive dictators in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang. They view this fight as a global fight unconstrained by geographic boundaries and the traditional forms of warfare. This axis of aggressors blends conventional military power with asymmetric tactics, including economic warfare, disinformation, and the use of proxy networks to undermine American security interests.”
“If confirmed,” Senator Wicker stated , “General Anderson will confront a growing array of threats on the African continent. The Chinese Communist Party views Africa as a critical link in Xi Jinping’s unprecedented global military expansion and continues to purchase new bases for the People’s Liberation Army. Vladimir Putin remains fully engaged in his destabilizing campaign to trade security assistance for access to Africa’s abundant natural resources. This is one of Mr. Putin’s ways to fund his malign activities around the world. All the while, Islamic violent extremist groups aligned with ISIS and al-Qaeda remain an enduring threat in Africa.”
“I look forward to General Anderson’s assessment of Africa’s importance to our national security,” said Senator Wicker, “as well as his description of what Africom’s strategy should be to counter the growing threat posed by China, Russia, and other adversaries across the continent. I’m particularly interested in how General Anderson plans to use America’s economic tools, including the Office of Strategic Capital, to combat Chinese influence.”
In a brief opening statement , Lieutenant General Anderson highlighted his years of service as commander of the Special Operations Command-Africa, where he “witnessed how Africa—strategically positioned between the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific—is increasingly at the convergence of great-power rivalry and terrorism. China is expanding its approach from a focus on economic influence to greater military and information operations. Russia’s actions are frequently destabilizing and run counter to US interests. Terrorist networks continue to exploit ungoverned spaces, posing a direct threat to our safety and security.”
Senator Wicker asked Anderson, “you talked about the activities of China in Africa. You talked about the activities of Russia under their dictator Vladimir Putin. Why do they do this? Are they helping Africa out of the goodness of their hearts?” Anderson responded, “I see from my time at Special Operations Command-Africa and my time in the Joint Staff that there is growing activity from both China and Russia on the continent. Both of these nations see their futures running through the continent and it is key to their strategy.”
Ranking Member Jack Reed (Democrat of Rhode Island) asked Anderson whether “in Somalia, do you think a continuous presence is essential?” Anderson said that “we’ve had a presence there for quite some time. We have seen some limited success there in training their forces. The Danab [Brigade] force is a capable counter-terrorism force. I do believe that that area is volatile. Al-Shabaab has shown the desire and will to attack the United States and United States interests. There’s increasing cooperation with the Houthis. So, I think it’s in our interests to have some level of engagement in that region.”
Senator Jacky Rosen (Democrat of Nevada) asked Anderson to “share more about the growing partnership between the Houthis and al-Shabaab and the risk that it poses not only to the US equities, but personnel in the region and global shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.” Anderson said that having been “commander of Special Operations Command-Africa, I am well aware that the al-Qaeda affiliate, that al-Shabaab is fully intent, has full intent to attack US interests in the US homeland, if they can build the capability. The concern is that cooperation now across the Red Sea with the Houthis who are backed by the Iranians, and what that could mean and give them the capability not just have the will, but now the capability to attack the US or US interests in a more robust way. And again, the Houthis and al-Shabaab operate in critical terrain for the United States and for global shipping and so they’ve the means for them to disrupt that and have impact on our interests is significant. So, we need to do everything we can to stop that partnership.”
Senator Deb Fischer (Republican of Nebraska) asked Anderson, “what do you think are the greatest areas of threats that you’re going to have to focus on if you are confirmed.” Anderson responded by saying that “I think China does pose a significant threat to US interests on the continent. We have seen how they have used the Belt and Road Initiative to be a primarily economic focus in the past. We are seeing them expand into more information operation on the continent, providing the communist propaganda to the continent. We’re also seeing them engage in more miliary to military engagements, which is concerning. Also, looking at some of the infrastructure they’re looking to develop and ports that could become dual use are of concern, especially if they have something on the Atlantic. An Atlantic base of sea-based Chinese ships would greatly complicate our security picture at large.”
Senator Ted Budd (Republican of North Carolina) asked Anderson “would you be willing to share with us some of your concerns in that area, particularly with PRC [People’s Republic of China] access to foreign ports in your area of responsibility?” Anderson said “as we’ve seen across the Indian Ocean into the Africom area of responsibility, into the Atlantic, and even the Mediterranean, China is investing in ports globally. I think that should be of concern to us. I think it should be concerning to us, not only that they could potentially use those as dual use military ports, but what access can they deny US forces or US commerce as necessary in time of conflict. And so, I think that this is an absolute critical area that we need to understand and the vulnerabilities that may be posed by this. It doesn’t mean that we don’t believe in free commerce and economics, but at the same time, we need to understand our national security interests and what these may entail.”
Senator Tommy Tuberville (Republican of Alabama) asked Anderson to assess the impact of the expulsion of US troops conducting ISR operators from the base that the United States constructed in Agadez, Niger, in the Sahel, and “the future there.” Anderson described the construction of the base in Niger as “a significant investment” and “a key area for us to be able to monitor the threat.” So, “the loss of that is one that we’ll have to find creative ways to continue to get the indicators and warnings of what the terrorists are doing in that area.” He went on to say “that the relationships that we built in Niger with the military over several decades are still there. When the time is right, I believe there will be an opportunity, but that time will have to be determined and, if confirmed, I’ll look at what that is.”
And Senator Tom Cotton (Republican of Arkansas) asked Anderson, “given your current role and also the threat of drone attacks from terrorist groups, in your future role, what are your thoughts” on “how drones are changing the modern battlefield?’ Anderson replied. “we are at a critical inflection point in history. Much like the industrial age matured in the early 20th century, the digital age is maturing now.” So, “we have to take this very seriously. Not just taking on the drone operations, but also what do we do to counter them and defend against them. This is a grave concern for me as I look at the African continent as there are vulnerabilities out there for our forces, but it’s also a vulnerability for our partners as well. And, I guess I should say it’s not just potential terrorist groups. It’s also potential insurgencies, uprisings, clashes of the kind that we see with unfortunate frequency in Africa as well.”
In response to advanced policy questions from the Senate committee, Anderson stated that “Secretary Hegseth has given US Africom two overarching priorities: prevent terrorist groups in Africa from exporting threats to the United States and to deter Chinese military advances across the continent. I will work to place pressure on terrorists with the intent and capability to threaten the homeland and work to improve indications and warnings of emerging threats. Additionally, I will task assigned forces to take actions that undermine any Chinese malign intent throughout the continent.”
And, he went on to say , “US Africom would need to consider the effects of Russia’s destabilizing activity on the continent and how it impacts US interests and military requirements.” Russia, Anderson stated, “seeks to systematically counter Western interests and bolster its influence through military/intelligence cooperation, arms sales, and energy partnerships. Moscow sees Africa as a vehicle necessary for its own success centered on developing the partnerships necessary for its vision of a multipolar world, while also presenting an opportunity for Russia to extract natural resources, weaken the West’s dominance of global governance, and recognize economic opportunities for Russian companies, particularly those closed off to Western markets because of sanctions.”
According to Anderson , “Russian military and security advisers currently do not pose a direct military threat to US personnel, but Russian deployments and influence organizations severely limit US Africom’s placement and access throughout the region, inhibiting campaign effectiveness. Russia’s pursuit of a permanent military presence and the deployment of Russian military and paramilitary personnel across Africa undermines democratic norms, destabilizes vulnerable security environments, disrupts UN missions, and threatens U.S. and Western progress. Additionally, Russia’s pervasive propaganda, guised as information operations, seeks to actively undermine US influence and highlight anti-western narratives throughout Africa. These propaganda efforts are as much an impediment to US government access as its military operations. Ultimately, Russia’s operations, activities, and investments complicate future US military and economic access and heighten the risk to U.S. national security interests in Africa.”
President Trump’s nomination of General Anderson as the next commander of Africom was confirmed by the full US Senate on 31 July 2025 by unanimous voice vote.
African Security Research Project 